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Leonard paper finds that removing hard-to-borrow stocks nearly triples the recent equity illiquidity alpha
New research by Greg Leonard argues the equity illiquidity premium is hidden rather than gone. Hard-to-borrow stocks tend to be both illiquid and low-returning, so removing the costliest-to-short names brings back much of the illiquid-stock outperformance that standard measures miss.
From the Alpha Architect article of November 13, 2026 and cited sources: When stocks in the top quintile of equity loan fees are excluded, the recent illiquidity alpha across all stocks rises from 0.17% to 0.49% per month. [1]
SOURCES[1] Alpha Architect – Is the Illiquidity Premium Really Gone?… alphaarchitect.com
AI-assisted, not human-edited. Methodology Corrections Who owns this site
- What happened
- When stocks in the top quintile of equity loan fees are excluded, the recent illiquidity alpha across all stocks rises from 0.17% to 0.49% per month. [1]
- Original source
- Alpha Architect article, independent perspective
- Brief by
- AT Pulse research desk AI-assisted; publisher and contact on the desk page
- When
- November 13, 2026 article published
- Covered
- Nov 14 edition
- Evidence
- 9 sources across 6 sites
- 1Alpha Architect – Is the Illiquidity Premium Really Gone?…alphaarchitect.com
- 2CXO Advisory – Stock Liquidity Premium Updatecxoadvisory.com
- 3Alpha Architect – The Vanishing Illiquidity Premiumalphaarchitect.com
- 4IDEAS/RePEc – related illiquidity paper entryideas.repec.org
- 5UNC Carolina Digital Repository – Leonard, Essays in…cdr.lib.unc.edu
- 6IDEAS/RePEc – The Loan Fee Anomaly, Management Science…ideas.repec.org
Reach: not measured yet
When stocks in the top quintile of equity loan fees are excluded, the recent illiquidity alpha across all stocks rises from 0.17% to 0.49% per month. [1]
The proposed mechanism is that borrowing costs raise market makers' adverse-selection and inventory costs. That makes short-constrained stocks less liquid. Because these stocks also have low expected returns, they drag down illiquid portfolios and bias simple illiquid-minus-liquid estimates toward zero. [5] [1]
The finding challenges earlier evidence that the premium had faded. Amihud's illiquid-minus-liquid factor fell from 0.64% to 0.43% per month after 1997. A 45-market study covering 1990 to 2020 found the premium only among microcaps. [2] [3] [4]
Separate peer-reviewed work finds that loan fees predict stock returns better than 102 other anomalies. This supports treating borrow cost as a control in liquidity-factor research. [6]
in a working paper not yet peer-reviewed, the premium roughly triples after the loan-fee screen.
Read the full assessment
Implication: liquidity factors built only on volume and spreads may understate the premium, and borrow cost affects both how it is measured and whether it can be captured.
Executive brief
The equity illiquidity premium may not have disappeared. It may be hidden by stocks that are expensive to borrow. Work by Greg Leonard finds that once stocks in the top quintile of loan fees are removed, the recent illiquidity alpha across all stocks rises from 0.17% to 0.49% per month, according to Alpha Architect's summary. The reason is that hard-to-short stocks tend to be illiquid and also have low expected returns, so they pull the premium down. For practitioners, this means measuring illiquidity with volume and spreads alone may be incomplete. Borrow cost and availability need to be part of the measure.
What changed and event timeline
Amihud documents a weaker premium
The illiquid-minus-liquid factor fell from 0.64% to 0.43% per month between 1964–1997 and 1998–2017. Results are gross of trading and shorting costs ().
Global study confines the premium to microcaps
Cakici and Zaremba, covering 45 markets from 1990 to 2020, find an illiquidity premium only among microcaps and none among large firms (;).
Leonard's UNC dissertation proposes the masking mechanism
Chapter 1 argues that short-sale-constrained stocks hide the premium, and that removing them brings it back ().
Loan fees confirmed as a dominant predictor
Engelberg, Evans, Leonard, Reed and Ringgenberg show that loan fees beat 102 other anomalies at predicting returns ().
Alpha Architect revisits the debate
The post summarizes Leonard's working paper and argues that measuring illiquidity must account for borrowing costs ().
Capabilities and access
- Research object: Leonard's working paper on the illiquidity premium among short-sale-constrained stocks, which grows out of his 2024 dissertation.
- Key input: equity loan fees from securities-lending data. "Special" stocks are those in the top loan-fee quintile (Alpha Architect).
- Securities-lending data is usually licensed from commercial vendors, so the results are harder to reproduce than studies built on CRSP data alone.
Read the full section
- Research object: Leonard's working paper on the illiquidity premium among short-sale-constrained stocks, which grows out of his 2024 dissertation. Coverage refers to it as an SSRN paper, but its exact version and date could not be confirmed.
- Key input: equity loan fees from securities-lending data. "Special" stocks are those in the top loan-fee quintile (Alpha Architect).
- Securities-lending data is usually licensed from commercial vendors, so the results are harder to reproduce than studies built on CRSP data alone. The reviewed sources do not name the data vendor.
Technical analysis for researchers and developers
- Mechanism: Leonard's model has borrowing costs raising both adverse-selection and inventory costs for market makers. Costly shorting therefore makes stocks less liquid (UNC).
- Omitted-variable problem: constrained stocks have low expected returns. That pushes down the returns of illiquid portfolios and biases simple illiquid-minus-liquid estimates toward zero.
- Method: exclude stocks in the top loan-fee quintile, then re-estimate the illiquidity alpha (Alpha Architect).
Read the full section
- Mechanism: Leonard's model has borrowing costs raising both adverse-selection and inventory costs for market makers. Costly shorting therefore makes stocks less liquid (UNC). As a result, illiquidity and short-sale constraints are correlated in the cross-section.
- Omitted-variable problem: constrained stocks have low expected returns. That pushes down the returns of illiquid portfolios and biases simple illiquid-minus-liquid estimates toward zero.
- Method: exclude stocks in the top loan-fee quintile, then re-estimate the illiquidity alpha (Alpha Architect).
- Implication: liquidity-factor research should include loan fees as a control, in line with the recommendation of the Loan Fee Anomaly paper.
Claims and evidence
- Recent all-stock illiquidity alpha rises from 0.17% to 0.49% per month once special stocks are excluded. Independent replication is not available.
- Premium declined after 1998 (CXO Advisory on Amihud).
- Premium confined to microcaps internationally (Alpha Architect on Cakici & Zaremba).
Read the full section
- Recent all-stock illiquidity alpha rises from 0.17% to 0.49% per month once special stocks are excluded. These figures come from Alpha Architect's summary of a working paper that has not been peer-reviewed (Alpha Architect). Independent replication is not available.
- Premium declined after 1998 (CXO Advisory on Amihud).
- Premium confined to microcaps internationally (Alpha Architect on Cakici & Zaremba).
- Loan-fee long-short returns of 4.01% per month, Sharpe ratio 0.66, with 42% of the effect unique (IDEAS/RePEc). This is peer-reviewed. Leonard is a co-author, so the two lines of work are not independent of each other.
Context and prior work
Amihud's illiquidity measure has long been the standard tool. Technological change and decimalization lowered trading costs, which is one explanation offered for the weaker premium (CXO Advisory). A separate body of work links short-sale constraints and loan fees to low future returns and less efficient prices, for example D'Avolio (JF) and Blocher & Ringgenberg. Leonard's contribution is to connect these two literatures.
Limitations, safety and contested findings
- Conflicting evidence remains. Cakici and Zaremba find no premium among large firms internationally (Alpha Architect).
- Amihud's estimates exclude rebalancing and shorting frictions (CXO Advisory). The reviewed summary does not report Leonard's alphas net of costs.
- Only a feed excerpt of the Alpha Architect article is available, and no independent coverage has corroborated the 0.17%/0.49% figures.
Read the full section
- Conflicting evidence remains. Cakici and Zaremba find no premium among large firms internationally (Alpha Architect). Leonard's result is a US working paper, and the reviewed sources do not say whether it extends to large-cap or non-US stocks.
- Gross versus net returns. Amihud's estimates exclude rebalancing and shorting frictions (CXO Advisory). The reviewed summary does not report Leonard's alphas net of costs.
- Thin coverage. Only a feed excerpt of the Alpha Architect article is available, and no independent coverage has corroborated the 0.17%/0.49% figures.
Business and practitioner implications
- Quant researchers: a liquidity factor built on volume, spread or price-impact measures alone may understate the premium.
- Portfolio implementers: borrow cost and availability affect both how a premium is measured and whether it can be captured, which is the article's core point (Alpha Architect).
- Allocators: whether "the premium is gone" depends on how the strategy is built, which universe it covers and how costs are counted.
Read the full section
- Quant researchers: a liquidity factor built on volume, spread or price-impact measures alone may understate the premium. Adding loan-fee screens or controls is the main change the evidence points to.
- Portfolio implementers: borrow cost and availability affect both how a premium is measured and whether it can be captured, which is the article's core point (Alpha Architect).
- Allocators: whether "the premium is gone" depends on how the strategy is built, which universe it covers and how costs are counted. This is a description of the research, not a recommendation to invest.