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Kofman and Stewart on Lex Fridman: Ukraine Has Its Best Ground Year Since 2023 as the Drone War Still Runs on Human Crews
Analysts Michael Kofman and Preston Stewart tell Lex Fridman that Ukraine's 2026 front-line performance is its strongest since mid-2023 while Russia's falters, and that the drone war remains intensely human-operated, with crews of two or three behind each FPV.
From the Lex Fridman Podcast podcast episode of November 10, 2026 and cited sources: Stewart estimates that each side flies roughly 8,000–10,000 FPV drones a day. [2] [5]
SOURCES[2] Transcript: #504 – Russia-Ukraine War: Putin, Zelenskyy… lexfridman.com[5] Meta-Defense: 15,000 FPV drones per day meta-defense.fr
AT Pulse research deskPublished · Updated · 5 min read · AI-assisted analysisAI-assisted, not human-edited. Methodology Corrections Who owns this site
- Original source
- Lex Fridman Podcast podcast episode, independent perspective
- Brief by
- AT Pulse research desk AI-assisted; publisher and contact on the desk page
- When
- November 10, 2026 podcast episode published
- Covered
- Nov 11 edition
- Evidence
- 11 sources across 9 sites; transcript sourced
- 1Lex Fridman Podcast #504 episode pagelexfridman.com
- 2Transcript: #504 – Russia-Ukraine War: Putin, Zelenskyy…lexfridman.com
- 3The Moscow Times: Gerasimov encirclement claims doubtedthemoscowtimes.com
- 4Ukrinform: Ukraine refutes Kupiansk claimukrinform.net
- 5Meta-Defense: 15,000 FPV drones per daymeta-defense.fr
- 6The Defense Post: Russian war spending hits record $123Bthedefensepost.com
RisingHow it’s measured
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Stewart estimates that each side flies roughly 8,000–10,000 FPV drones a day. Russia's official figure of 15,000 a day describes production capacity, not drones flown. Kofman says almost all of these systems are remotely piloted by two- or three-person crews, so both armies have had to move manpower into drone units. [2] [5]
Kofman calls 2026 Russia's weakest year of ground combat since winter 2023 and Ukraine's strongest since summer 2023. He says Russian assault tactics hit diminishing returns by summer 2025, leaving Moscow to rely more on strategic bombardment. His estimate that the war takes about 44% of Russia's budget closely matches an SWP analysis, which puts it at 43.8%, or about 10.5% of GDP. [2] [6]
Both guests say inflated claims of territorial control travel up Russia's chain of command, sending units forward with wrong maps and costing lives. ISW and pro-war Russian bloggers disputed Gerasimov's late-2025 claim that Ukrainian forces near Kupiansk were encircled. [2] [3] [4]
Stewart says the US military has not yet settled which branch owns drones, and that the Pentagon's drone dominance program is looking for small, agile manufacturers. In his other commentary, he says combat units value cheap, expendable, field-repairable gear over exquisite platforms. [2] [10] [11]
the guests describe remotely piloted, not autonomous, systems and a kill chain that depends heavily on manpower.
Read the full assessment
Implication: defense-tech value may lie in cheap, repairable volume and in tools that reduce operator workload, rather than in exquisite platforms or full autonomy.
Executive brief
In Lex Fridman Podcast #504, Carnegie senior fellow Michael Kofman argues that 2026 is Russia's worst year of ground combat since winter 2023 and Ukraine's best since summer 2023. He also says Russian tactics had already hit diminishing returns by summer 2025 (transcript). Preston Stewart estimates that each side flies roughly 8,000–10,000 FPV drones a day, and Kofman adds that almost none of them are autonomous: each needs a two- or three-person crew. For technologists, the key point is that this drone war still runs on people, not AI autonomy. Both guests are commentators, so their battlefield assessments are expert opinion, not measured data.
What changed and event timeline
May 2023: Bakhmut grinds on
Kofman calls the battle a politically freighted "fixing fight" whose loss mattered little. He notes Russia then needed about a year to reach Chasiv Yar next door ().
Ukraine's counteroffensive fails
Kofman says the Western-trained summer offensive fell short of high expectations. Russia then took the initiative at Avdiivka that autumn ().
- Late Oct–Nov 2025
Disputed Kupiansk "encirclement."
Gerasimov told Putin that Ukrainian forces near Kupiansk and Pokrovsk were encircled. ISW said it saw no supporting evidence, and pro-war bloggers also doubted the claim (;).
Russia claims 15,000 FPVs a day
Deputy PM Denis Manturov told Kommersant that Russia's capacity is more than 15,000 FPV drones per day, up from about 15,000 per month in 2023 ().
Russian war spending hits a record
An SWP analysis of Russian Finance Ministry data puts first-half 2026 war spending at $123.4B: 43.8% of federal spending and about 10.5% of GDP, against 6.7% planned ().
Episode #504 published
Stewart and Kofman spend about three hours on drones, the 2022 invasion, Bakhmut, Wagner, leadership and paths to peace ().
Capabilities and access
- This is a war-analysis episode, so there is no AI model or version involved.
- Stewart describes a casualty-evacuation drone with an attached pod, made by a company he calls SkyFall and used by Ukraine's CODE 9.2 regiment.
- The episode and a full transcript are free on lexfridman.com.
Read the full section
- This is a war-analysis episode, so there is no AI model or version involved. The systems discussed are fixed-wing reconnaissance drones, FPV quadcopters (about 12–20 inches) with swappable warheads, one-way attack drones, and uncrewed ground vehicles (UGVs) (transcript).
- Stewart describes a casualty-evacuation drone with an attached pod, made by a company he calls SkyFall and used by Ukraine's CODE 9.2 regiment. It flew a wounded soldier back from about 30 km away.
- The episode and a full transcript are free on lexfridman.com. Chapters: drones at 21:59, "who has the advantage" at 59:09, the invasion at 1:10:46, peace at 2:43:33.
Technical analysis for researchers and developers
- People are the bottleneck. Kofman says drone teams typically need a pilot, a navigator and a technician who arms the system.
- The kill chain: reconnaissance drones spot a target, pass it to the right drone unit, and an FPV or other system strikes it.
- Russia uses armored (mechanized) assaults to draw Ukrainian drone attention while motorcycles and ATVs slip through gaps between three-man outposts several hundred meters apart.
Read the full section
- People are the bottleneck. Kofman says drone teams typically need a pilot, a navigator and a technician who arms the system. Both armies have had to move substantial manpower into drone units (transcript).
- The kill chain: reconnaissance drones spot a target, pass it to the right drone unit, and an FPV or other system strikes it.
- Russian tactics adapted. Russia uses armored (mechanized) assaults to draw Ukrainian drone attention while motorcycles and ATVs slip through gaps between three-man outposts several hundred meters apart.
- The "map" is unreliable. Kofman says false claims of territorial control flow up the Russian chain of command, so front-line maps and control data are noisy.
Claims and evidence
- Kofman's figures (44% of the budget, about 9–10% of GDP) closely match SWP's 43.8% and 10.5% (The Defense Post).
- 8,000–10,000 FPVs per day per side is Stewart's estimate. Manturov's 15,000-a-day figure is an official production-capacity claim, not a count of drones used (Meta-Defense).
- The guests say inflated Russian claims cost lives. The Kupiansk encirclement claim was disputed by ISW and by Russian bloggers (The Moscow Times).
Read the full section
- Russia's budget strain. Kofman's figures (44% of the budget, about 9–10% of GDP) closely match SWP's 43.8% and 10.5% (The Defense Post).
- 8,000–10,000 FPVs per day per side is Stewart's estimate. Manturov's 15,000-a-day figure is an official production-capacity claim, not a count of drones used (Meta-Defense).
- Misleading Russian maps. The guests say inflated Russian claims cost lives. The Kupiansk encirclement claim was disputed by ISW and by Russian bloggers (The Moscow Times).
- North Korean shells at one point making up 40% of Russia's artillery ammunition, and Russian losses of 30,000+ a month, are the guests' statements. The reviewed sources do not corroborate either.
Context and prior work
- In July 2026, Rob Lee of FPRI and Stewart said logistics vehicles have become "essentially disposable" and that the war's dynamics shift daily (FPRI).
- Kofman covers the war regularly on War on the Rocks, including an episode on lessons about mass and maneuver for future wars (War on the Rocks).
- Ukrainian maker FirePoint reports producing 200 long-range strike drones a day (ArmyInform).
Read the full section
- In July 2026, Rob Lee of FPRI and Stewart said logistics vehicles have become "essentially disposable" and that the war's dynamics shift daily (FPRI).
- Kofman covers the war regularly on War on the Rocks, including an episode on lessons about mass and maneuver for future wars (War on the Rocks).
- Ukrainian maker FirePoint reports producing 200 long-range strike drones a day (ArmyInform).
Limitations, safety and contested findings
- Control of territory is hard to measure. Kofman describes Kostiantynivka as "marbled," with Russian and Ukrainian troops sheltering in neighboring basements (transcript).
- Stewart warns that this war, fought with neither side controlling the air, is not a template for every future conflict.
- Kofman stresses humility: early forecasts overrated Russia, and he says history may not be settled for a long time.
Read the full section
- Control of territory is hard to measure. Kofman describes Kostiantynivka as "marbled," with Russian and Ukrainian troops sheltering in neighboring basements (transcript).
- Stewart warns that this war, fought with neither side controlling the air, is not a template for every future conflict.
- Kofman stresses humility: early forecasts overrated Russia, and he says history may not be settled for a long time.
- Ukraine's improved front-line performance comes alongside an expanding Russian strike campaign against Ukrainian infrastructure, and the guests call the coming winter uncertain.
Business and practitioner implications
- Defense-tech buyers prize cheap, expendable volume and gear that is easy to fix in the field, not exquisite platforms.
- Tools that cut operator workload, such as navigation help, logistics support and reliable situational awareness, address the manpower bottleneck the guests describe.
- Stewart says US ownership of drones across the military is still being worked out, and that the Pentagon is running a "drone dominance" program to find small, agile manufacturers.
Read the full section
- Defense-tech buyers prize cheap, expendable volume and gear that is easy to fix in the field, not exquisite platforms. Stewart has discussed what Western firms misunderstand about combat (DefenseScoop; War on the Rocks).
- Tools that cut operator workload, such as navigation help, logistics support and reliable situational awareness, address the manpower bottleneck the guests describe.
- Stewart says US ownership of drones across the military is still being worked out, and that the Pentagon is running a "drone dominance" program to find small, agile manufacturers.
The source trail.
Sources (11)
Lex Fridman Podcast #504 episode page
lexfridman.comTranscript: #504 – Russia-Ukraine War: Putin, Zelenskyy, Drones and the Future of Warfare
published_transcript
lexfridman.com